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ABSTRACT
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction was drafted “to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
State” and “to ensure that the rights of custody and of access under
the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the
other Contracting States.” To that end, when a child is wrongfully
removed from his country of habitual residence in violation of a
valid custody order, and less than one year has elapsed since the
date of abduction, the Convention provides a single remedy, set out
in Article 12: return of the child “forthwith.” Article 12 also
provides that if more than one year has elapsed since the date of
abduction, a child must still be returned, unless he is “now settled”
*
Law Clerk to the Honorable Martha C. Daughtrey, Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals; former Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District
Court for the District of New Hampshire, who presided over the Yaman trial
(the views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone); J.D., Boston
University School of Law; M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University. Many thanks to Beau Barnes for his early
editorial assistance.
**
Equal Justice Works Fellow, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New
York; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Johannes
Widmalm-Delphonse and Marie Ndiaye for their assistance.

106

ROSSIANDSTARKFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PLAYING SOLOMON

3/2/2014 12:08 PM

107

in his new environment. Federal circuit courts have addressed
whether the one-year time period in Article 12 may be tolled to
prevent an abducting parent who successfully conceals her child
for more than one year from benefiting from the so-called “settled
defense.”
This Article focuses on a legal question that is
intertwined with the equitable tolling question: whether the
Convention or its implementing legislation grants United States
federal or state courts equitable discretion to return a child deemed
settled. This Article argues that, in light of the Convention’s text
and drafting history, principles of federalism, and the legislative
history of the Convention’s implementing legislation, federal courts
lack such authority entirely, and state courts possess it pursuant
only to state family law.
“If ever there were an area in which federal courts should heed
the admonition of Justice Holmes that ‘a page of history is worth a
volume of logic,’ it is in the area of domestic relations.” 1
“[I]f children were chattel, I would take the children from Mrs.
Yaman and give them to Mr. Yaman. But children aren’t chattel
and the Convention doesn’t treat children as chattel. It treats
children as human beings and recognizes that they have a strong
interest in being reunited with the parent . . . from whom they were
wrongfully removed. But they also have a strong interest in living
their li[ves] where they’re settled that ought not [lightly] [] be
disturbed.” 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Linda Margherita Yaman, an American citizen, met Ozgur
Yaman, a Turkish citizen, while Ozgur was pursuing postgraduate studies at Wayne State University in Michigan. 3 They
married in 1997. 4 By all accounts, their first years together were

1. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
2. Transcript of Bench Trial at 77–78, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp.
2d 189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 165.
3. See Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 190 (D.N.H. 2013).
4. Id.
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happy ones. 5 In 2004, however, after the couple moved to Turkey
to raise their family, Linda’s mother told Linda that Linda’s
grandmother had seen Ozgur sexually abusing the couple’s older
daughter. 6 Unable to prove or disprove the allegation, Linda
became increasingly paranoid that her husband was molesting
their daughter. 7 She grew preoccupied with identifying signs of
abuse and terrified that she was failing to protect her daughters.8
Ozgur, who repeatedly denied the allegation, became frustrated
with his wife’s accusations and her refusal to believe him over her
mother. 9 Linda’s mother “was very upset, horrified, very angry at
[her]” for staying with Ozgur and told Linda “that [she] was a bad
mother” for staying with “an abuser.” 10
The couple started marriage counseling and, unable to
convince Linda that he had not sexually abused their daughter,
Ozgur moved out of the family home. 11 In February 2005, he filed
for divorce, citing the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.12
A Turkish family court conducted an extensive investigation into
the abuse allegation and, in March 2006, concluded that it was
false.13 The court granted sole custody of the children to Ozgur,
though the girls remained in Linda’s custody while she appealed
the decision.14 The Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed
the custody decision on April 3, 2007, and Linda again appealed
the decision. 15
While the divorce and custody proceedings were ongoing,
Linda devised a plan to flee Turkey with the children. 16 The girls’
passports were in a safe at Ozgur’s parents’ house, and Linda

5. Transcript of Bench Trial at 20–21, 29, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F.
Supp. 2d 189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 170.
6. Id. at 24–25.
7. Id. at 31.
8. Id. at 31–33.
9. Id. at 74.
10. Id. at 47 (testimony of Linda Yaman).
11. Id. at 73–74.
12. See Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
13. Id. at 191.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Transcript of Bench Trial at 128, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170; see Nadya Labi, The Snatchback, THE ATLANTIC (November 1, 2009),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/11/
the-snatchback/307704/ (last visited January 14, 2014).
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knew she would be unable to obtain them without revealing her
intention to leave Turkey. 17 Undeterred, she contacted Gus
Zamora—a former United States Army Ranger and self-described
“snatchback” professional who specializes in returning children to
their custodial parents 18—and hired him at a cost of $70,000, paid
by her parents, to help her and her daughters get out of Turkey
without their passports. 19
Meanwhile, on July 16, 2007, the court denied Linda’s second
appeal, and on August 3, 2007, the Turkish Family Court entered
its final ruling, awarding custody to Ozgur and ending the appeals
process. 20 Ozgur learned of the court’s decision on August 6, 21 but
by the time Ozgur and his lawyers attempted to implement the
custody order, Linda and the girls were already gone.
On August 11, Ozgur went to Linda’s house to see his
daughters and discovered that no one was home.22 He
immediately went to the police, 23 who later issued a warrant for
Linda’s arrest.24 Two days later, Ozgur successfully moved the
court to issue a travel ban prohibiting the girls from leaving
Turkey—to no avail. 25 By then, Linda and the children had
already fled Turkey overnight in a scuba diving powerboat bound
for Greece. 26 Once in Greece, Linda applied for passports for her
daughters. 27 She lied on the passport application forms, claiming
that the girls’ passports were stolen and that her husband had

17. Transcript of Bench Trial at 133, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170; Transcript of Bench Trial at 105, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d
189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 173.
18. Transcript of Bench Trial at 128, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170; see Labi, supra note 16.
19. Transcript of Bench Trial at 129, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170.
20. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
21. Transcript of Bench Trial at 47, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d
189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 174.
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 59.
25. Id. at 51.
26. Transcript of Bench Trial at 104, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 173.
27. Transcript of Bench Trial at 133, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170; Transcript of Bench Trial at 105, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 173.
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abandoned them. 28 The embassy denied the applications. 29
With no passports for her daughters and no ability to fly to
the United States, Linda looked for somewhere else they could
30
settle temporarily. She decided to travel to Andorra, a small
country that is located between Spain and France and is not a
member of the European Union.31 Linda and her daughters took
a boat from Greece to Italy and then drove an RV through Italy.32
She then rented a car and drove from Italy to France. 33 When she
crossed the border into Andorra, Linda hid the children under
pillows in the backseat of the car to avoid requests from border
security to see the girls’ passports. 34 While Linda and the girls
were in Andorra, Dateline NBC, a television newsmagazine that
35
airs investigative feature stories, interviewed Linda and aired
her story on television, but the show kept her location secret.36
They lived in Andorra for about two and a half years. During
this time, Ozgur continued searching for his children. He
communicated with officials in Turkey and the United States. 37
Ozgur filed a criminal complaint with the police in Turkey. As of
January 2013, the date of the hearing, there was an outstanding
warrant for Linda’s arrest in Turkey.38 Ozgur requested the help
28. Transcript of Bench Trial at 133, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170.
29. Transcript of Bench Trial at 107, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 173. The trial testimony does not indicate the reason for the denial.
30. The CIA website describes Andorra as roughly 2.5 times the size of
Washington, D.C. It has a population of 85,293 people. See Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Andorra, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/an.html.
31. Transcript of Bench Trial at 110, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 173.
32. Transcript of Bench Trial at 137–38, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189,
ECF No. 170.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See About the Show, Dateline NBC, http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/3032600/#54003247 (last visited January 21, 2014).
36. Transcript of Bench Trial at 131, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170; Dateline: On the Run (NBC television broadcast Sept. 10, 2010),
available at http://insidedateline.nbcnews.com/_news/2010/09/10/
5085975-on-the-run (last visited January 14, 2014).
37. Transcript of Bench Trial at 45, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 173.
38. Transcript of Bench Trial at 59, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 174.
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of Interpol, an international police organization, 39 to search for his
children, but the agency was unable to help because Ozgur did not
have his daughters’ fingerprints. 40 He searched the Internet to
find information about Linda, her parents, and his daughters, but
discovered addresses only in Oregon and Michigan, and soon
learned that the girls were not there. 41
Eventually, Linda secured one-time-use passports for her
daughters so they could enter the United States. They arrived in
April 2010 and later settled in New Hampshire. 42 Ozgur received
notice from the State Department when the passports were
issued. 43 He contacted a lawyer in the United States to help him
locate his children and bring them back to Turkey. 44 In late 2011
or early 2012, Ozgur finally learned from the United States State
Department that his daughters were in New Hampshire. 45 In
June 2012, he filed a petition pursuant to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
46
Abduction —implemented in the United States by the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”) 47—
seeking a court order requiring his ex-wife to return the children
to him. 48 Linda opposed the petition, arguing that the girls faced
a grave threat of harm if they were returned to Ozgur in Turkey
and that the petition should be denied because the girls were
settled in New Hampshire. 49
The District Court of New Hampshire conducted a three-day
hearing in January 2013 under the Hague Convention. The court
found that: (1) Linda had failed to provide clear and convincing

39. See Overview, INTERPOL.NET, http://www.interpol.int/AboutINTERPOL/Overview (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
40. Id. at 58, 60.
41. Id. at 62.
42. Transcript of Bench Trial at 127, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 170.
43. Id. at 67.
44. Id. at 71.
45. Id.
46. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2013).
48. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
49. See id.
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evidence of any abuse by Ozgur; 50 (2) she had violated a Turkish
custody order by fleeing and actively concealing the children after
leaving Turkey; 51 and (3) Ozgur had searched in good faith for his
children.52 The court then considered Linda’s argument that the
children were settled in New Hampshire. Ozgur asked the court
to equitably toll the one-year period in Article 12 of the
Convention, which creates an exception to return when children
are settled in their new environment. Specifically, Ozgur asked
the court to toll the one-year period until the date on which he was
finally able to locate his daughters. He also argued in the
alternative that the court should preclude Linda from raising the
settled defense at all because she actively concealed the children,
making it impossible for him to file his claim within the one-year
period. The court rejected both of these equitable arguments and
concluded that the children were settled in the United States
within the meaning of Article 12.
In light of the court’s conclusion, Ozgur then asked the court
to exercise “equitable discretion” and issue a return order for his
children, notwithstanding the court’s finding that they were now
settled.53 The court denied Ozgur’s request, 54 concluding that
neither the Hague Convention nor its implementing legislation
granted federal courts the power to return a settled child. 55
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision denying Ozgur’s petition, reaffirming its ruling that the
Convention does not permit equitable tolling, but rejecting the
district court’s ruling that it lacked equitable discretion to return
50. Transcript of Bench Trial at 53, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 165.
51. Transcript of Bench Trial at 3–4, 68, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189,
ECF No. 173.
52. Transcript of Bench Trial at 109, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 167.
53. See Petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Preclude Respondent from Presenting the Affirmative Defense of
“Settledness,” Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 143.
54. Transcript of Bench Trial at 81, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 165.
55. Id. at 15 (concluding “that I lack equitable discretion to order the
return of a settled child”); id. at 73 (concluding by a preponderance of the
evidence that the children are settled in New Hampshire); id. at 80–81 (“So,
I’m not going to order return under the Hague Convention and I’m resolving
this case with respect to the Hague Convention claim and directing that
judgment be entered for the respondent.”).
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a settled child. 56 Instead, the First Circuit held that “Article 12 []
does provide a mechanism to prevent misconduct from being
rewarded without resort to equitable tolling,” namely, “equitable
discretion.” 57 Despite the First Circuit’s decision to reverse the
district court on the equitable discretion issue, it affirmed the
district court’s decision denying Ozgur’s petition because the
district judge had also held that, even if the court had equitable
discretion, in light of all the relevant factors, he would not exercise
it in this case.58
Using the Yaman case as its primary lens, this Article
examines the text and history of the Hague Convention and
ICARA, principles of federalism and international comity, and the
rules of federal jurisdiction and concludes that the district court in
the Yaman case correctly concluded that neither the Convention
nor ICARA grants courts equitable discretion to return a settled
child.
Part II maps the legal background of the Hague
Convention, describing the criteria for establishing a prima facie
case and the defenses available to rebut it. Part III analyzes the
text and drafting history of the Convention, as well as decisions of
foreign courts, and argues that the Convention does not authorize
courts to exercise equitable discretion to return a settled child.
Part IV examines the legislative history of ICARA and
determines that Congress implemented the Convention without
modifying or expanding the powers provided by it. Part V argues
that an exercise of equitable discretion invites a proscribed
“custody-type” decision that Congress prohibited federal courts
from making, and also invites courts to rebalance competing
interests that the drafters of the Convention carefully weighed in
writing Article 12. Part VI concludes that, though a United States
court may order the return of a settled child, that order may be
issued pursuant only to domestic family law and may not be
issued pursuant to the Convention or ICARA. In other words, in
the American judicial system, it is only state courts—not federal

56. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12–17 (1st Cir. 2013).
57. Id. at 13 (quoting Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he way the provision functions renders this sort of equitable relief
unnecessary.”).
58. See Transcript of Bench Trial at 80–81, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189,
ECF No. 165.
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courts—that “play Solomon.” 59
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

A. The Hague Convention: An explanation of a Prima Facie Case
and the defenses available under Articles 12, 13, and 20
The Hague Convention 60 was adopted in 1980 by the
Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law. 61 Its two main purposes were “to secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in
any Contracting State” and “to ensure that rights of custody and
of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States.” 62 The drafters wanted
to address the problem of international child abductions occurring
during domestic disputes and divorce proceedings. 63 The United
States is a Contracting State, and Congress implemented the
Convention through ICARA. 64 In 2012, there were a total of 1,143
applications seeking the return of 1,617 children 65 submitted to
the United States Central Authority, which oversees

59. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186 (1988); see 1 Kings 3:16–
28.
60. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
61. See Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009).
62. Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 1.
63. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010) (“The Convention was
adopted in 1980 in response to the problem of international child abductions
during domestic disputes.”); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“The primary purpose of the Hague Convention is ‘to preserve the status quo
and to deter parents from crossing international boundaries in search of a
more sympathetic court.’”) (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396,
1400 (6th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Friedrich I]); Feder v. Evans–Feder, 63 F.3d
217, 221 (3rd Cir .1995) (“[the Convention] is designed to restore the ‘factual’
status quo which is unilaterally altered when a parent abducts a child and
aims to protect the legal custody rights of the non-abducting parent.”); Shalit
v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Hague Convention . . .
addressed the increasing problem of international child abduction in the
context of international law while respecting rights of custody and visitation
under national law.”).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2013).
65. 2012 Outgoing Case Statistics, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, available
at http://travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/resources_3860.html#statistics.
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implementation of the Convention in the United States. 66
A parent seeking the return of a child abducted to the United
States (the left-behind parent) may file a petition pursuant to both
the Convention and the enforcement provisions of ICARA in either
state or federal court. 67 The left-behind parent must satisfy the
elements of a prima facie case as set out in Article 3 of the
Convention by proving that the child was wrongfully removed
from the child’s habitual residence in violation of a valid custody
order issued in a Contracting State.68 Importantly, a hearing
conducted pursuant to the Convention “is not meant . . . to inquire
into the merits of any custody dispute underlying the petition for
return.” 69 Instead, the sole purpose of the hearing is to determine
in which jurisdiction the parents must settle their custody
dispute.70 Neither ICARA nor the Convention vests judicial or
administrative authorities with the power to resolve an
underlying custody dispute.71 In fact, each document states
explicitly that it does not confer such power. 72 Instead, the
Convention provides a single remedy, set out in Article 12: “the
return of the child forthwith.” 73
The return remedy, however, is not absolute. The Convention
provides several defenses, each of which was intended to be
construed “narrowly.” 74 Article 13, for example, states that a
66. Hague Convention, supra note 46, arts. 6, 7 (providing that each
Contracting State shall establish a “Central Authority” to ensure compliance
with the Convention).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2013).
68. Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 3a; see Asvesta v. Petroutsas,
580 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060,
1064 (6th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Friedrich II].
69. Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2013); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d
844, 847 (8th Cir. 2008); HAGUE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION LEGAL ANALYSIS, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10511 (Mar. 26, 1986)
[hereinafter State Department Analysis].
71. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4); Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 19.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (“The Convention and this chapter empower
courts in the United States to determine only rights under the Convention
and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”); Hague
Convention, supra note 46, art. 19 (“A decision under this Convention
concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on
the merits of any custody issue.”).
73. Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 12.
74. See e.g., Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002)
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court applying the Convention “is not bound to order the return of
the child” if the person opposing return demonstrates that “there
is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation.” 75 A respondent may also argue under
Article 13 that the left-behind parent was failing to exercise his
custody rights at the time of removal; the left-behind parent
consented to or acquiesced in the removal; or the child objects to
being returned and “has attained an age and degree of maturity at
which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” 76 Article 20
provides an additional defense, stating that “return of the child
under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not
be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.” 77
If more than one year has passed since the date of abduction,
a respondent may pursue an additional defense pursuant to the
second sentence of Article 12,78 as Linda Yaman did. 79 That
provision states that “even where the proceedings have been

(“Exceptions to the general rule of expedient return . . . are to be construed
narrowly.”); Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009)(citing
the Pérez-Vera Report and the State Department’s interpretation of the
Convention infra) (“Although these exceptions or defenses are available,
numerous interpretations of the Convention caution that courts must
narrowly interpret the exceptions lest they swallow the rule of return.”). In
her report, Convention Reporter Elisa Pérez–Vera observed that “a
systematic invocation of the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen
by the abductor for that of the child’s residence, would lead to the collapse of
the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual
confidence which is its inspiration.” Elisa Pérez–Vera, EXPLANATORY REPORT
ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION 435, ¶ 34 (1982),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter Pérez–Vera
Report]. Expressing similar concerns, the U.S. State Department has noted
that, “[i]n drafting Articles 13 and 20 [of the Report], the representatives of
countries participating in negotiations on the Convention were aware that
any exceptions had to be drawn very narrowly lest their application
undermine the express purposes of the Convention—to effect the prompt
return of abducted children.” State Department Analysis, supra note 70, at
10509.
75. Hague Convention, supra note 57, art. 13(b).
76. Id. at art. 13.
77. Id. at art. 20.
78. Id. at art. 12.
79. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013).
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commenced after the expiration of the one year referred to in the
preceding paragraph, [the judicial or administrative authority]
shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated
that the child is now settled in its new environment.” 80 Thus, if
more than one year has passed since the date of abduction, the
abducting parent may argue that the child should not be returned
because the child is “now settled” in the country to which the child
was abducted.
The drafters debated extensively the length of time during
which the return remedy in Article 12 should be readily available.
They realized that the time period would have to address a
number of competing interests, including protecting a child’s
interest in not being repeatedly uprooted, advancing the
Convention’s goal of deterring child abduction and concealment,
and enforcing valid custody orders.81 The drafters also wanted to
ensure that hearings pursuant to the Hague Convention could be
conducted quickly.82
The drafters considered a number of ways to balance these
interests. 83 One proposal was to include two time periods: a
shorter one for cases in which the child’s location was known, and
a longer one for cases in which the child had been concealed.84
Another proposal was to toll the beginning of the time period
within which a child must be returned “forthwith” until the child
was discovered or should have been discovered.85 The drafters
were concerned, however, that a discovery rule of any sort would
raise complicated “proof problems” that might prolong a hearing.86
Thus, the drafters also considered a single time period and
debated the appropriate length; they discussed a six-month time
period, 87 an eighteen-month time period, 88 and a one-year time
80.
81.

Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 12 (emphasis added).
HCCH, Child Abduction, in ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME
SESSION 168 (1980) [hereinafter Preparatory Work].
82. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 465.
83. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12; Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 53–54
(2d Cir. 2012).
84. Preparatory Work, supra note 81.
85. Id. at 231–32.
86. See, e.g., Preparatory Work, supra note 81 at 291; Pérez-Vera Report,
supra note 74, at 459.
87. Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 292.
88. Id. at 216, 315.
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period with a mechanism to revise the time period in light of the
lessons learned as countries implemented the Convention over
subsequent years. 89 The drafters eventually agreed to include a
single time period 90 of one year, 91 though the United States
remained concerned that such a short period of time “may benefit
those abductors who have the financial means and the aid of
relatives or friends to arrange for life underground.” 92
The Article 12 settled defense was central to the outcome of
the Yaman case. Ozgur filed his petition in June 2012, almost five
years after August 2007, when Linda fled with the children in
violation of a valid Turkish custody order.93 Linda conceded that
Ozgur had satisfied the elements of a prima facie case.94 Thus,
the hearing focused on the defenses Linda raised, especially the
settled defense and whether the one-year period in Article 12 may
be tolled due to concealment. 95 Ozgur also argued that, even if the
court permitted Linda to raise the Article 12 defense and
concluded that the girls were settled in New Hampshire, the court
retained “equitable discretion” to return the children, and should
exercise that discretion in this case and return the girls.96
The concepts of equitable discretion and equitable tolling are
closely related. So, before addressing equitable discretion—the
heart of this Article—it is necessary to explain the circuit split
related to equitable tolling of the one-year period in Article 12. 97
89. Id. at 292.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 292–93.
92. Id. at 242 (proposing that Article 12 include two time periods, a oneyear time period for cases in which the child was not concealed, and a twoyear time limit for cases of concealment).
93. See Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (D.N.H. 2013).
94. See Transcript of Bench Trial at 3–4, 68, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d
189, ECF No. 173.
95. See Transcript of Bench Trial at 2–9, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189,
ECF No. 165. Linda also argued pursuant to Article 13 that, in light of
Ozgur’s alleged sexual abuse of the older daughter, the girls faced a grave
risk of harm if they were returned to Turkey. Id. The court concluded that
Linda failed to prove the defense by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
This Article focuses solely on the Article 12 settled defense, though the
authors note that Article 13 also presented contentious issues for the parties
in the Yaman case.
96. Id. at 12; Petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Preclude Respondent from Presenting the Affirmative Defense of
“Settledness” at 15, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 143.
97. The Supreme Court will decide during the October 2013 term
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B. Article 12 and the “Settled” Defense: A closer look at the circuit
split related to equitable tolling
The outcome of the Yaman trial hinged in significant part on
the court’s interpretation of Article 12, specifically, whether the
start of the one-year period within which a child must be returned
“forthwith” could be equitably tolled to preclude an abducting
parent who concealed her child from raising the settled defense.
Article 12 states:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in
terms of Article 3 and . . . a period of less than one year
has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or
retention, the authority concerned shall order the return
of the child forthwith . . . The judicial or administrative
authority, even where the proceedings have commenced
after the expiration of the period of one year[,] . . . shall
also order the return of the child, unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment.98
Five circuit courts—most recently, the First Circuit in
Yaman—have considered whether the one-year time period set out
in Article 12 may be equitably tolled in cases in which the
abducting parent has concealed the child: the Fifth,99 Ninth,100
and Eleventh 101 Circuits have concluded that the Convention
permits equitable tolling, and the First 102 and Second 103 Circuits
have held that it does not. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Lozano v. Alvarez, the Second Circuit case, and will resolve the
circuit split this term. 104

whether Article 12 of the Hague Convention permits equitable tolling. See
Lozano, 697 F.3d 41, cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No.
12–820).
98. Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 12.
99. Dietz v. Dietz, 349 Fed. Appx. 930, 933–35 (5th Cir. 2009).
100. Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 2008).
101. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004).
102. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1,at 4 (1st Cir. 2013).
103. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012).
104. See id., cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12–
820).
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1.

Decisions by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits

Treating the one-year period in Article 12 as a statute of
limitations, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Furnes v. Reeves “that
equitable tolling may apply to ICARA petitions for the return of a
child where the parent removing the child has secreted the child
from the parent seeking return.” 105 The court cited Supreme
Court precedent on statutes of limitations, stating that “[i]t is
hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to
equitable tolling, unless tolling would be inconsistent with the text
of the relevant statute.” 106 There were numerous deficiencies in
the court’s analysis. For example, it failed to address on what
basis it concluded that the one-year period was a statute of
limitations subject to equitable tolling, 107 Article 12’s textual
silence on equitable tolling, 108 or the drafting history of the
Convention. 109
Despite these defects, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning gained
traction when the Ninth Circuit examined the issue and based its
analysis largely on Furnes. 110 The Ninth Circuit concluded in
Duarte that “equitable principles may be applied to toll the oneyear period when circumstances suggest that the abducting parent
took steps to conceal the whereabouts of the child from the parent
seeking return and such concealment delayed the filing of the
petition for return.” 111 The court acknowledged concerns about
uprooting a settled child notwithstanding the parent’s
concealment 112 but stated that “we must give significant
consideration to the overarching intention of the Convention” to
It concluded that “awarding an
deter child abduction. 113
abducting parent an affirmative defense if that parent hides the
child . . . would not only encourage child abductions, but also

105. 362 F.3d at 723.
106. Id.
107. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52 (explaining why the one-year period in
Article 12 is not a statute of limitations).
108. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (“The text of
Article 12 does not address equitable tolling explicitly.”).
109. See id; see also Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52–54.
110. See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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encourage hiding the child from the parent seeking return.”114
Thus, “consistent with the purpose of the Convention to deter
child abduction,” the Ninth Circuit permitted equitable tolling of
the one-year period in Article 12. 115 In Dietz v. Dietz, the Fifth
Circuit also held that a court may equitably toll the one-year
period in Article 12. 116 This case, however, “adds nothing to the
debate because it addresse[d] the issue in a summary fashion.” 117
2.

Decisions by the First and Second Circuits

The First and Second Circuits reached the opposite conclusion
of that reached by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 118 In
Lozano v. Alvarez, the Second Circuit focused first on the text of
the Convention, noting that “[n]either Article 12 of the Hague
Convention nor its implementing legislation, ICARA, explicitly
permit[s] or prohibit[s] tolling of the one-year period before a
parent can raise the now settled defense.” 119 The Lozano court
next explained that the one-year period should not be treated as a
statute of limitations because “the settled defense merely permits
courts to consider the interests of a child who has been in a new
environment for more than a year before ordering that child to be
returned to her country of habitual residency,” 120 in contrast to a
statute of limitations after the expiration of which the ability to
file is lost. In other words, regardless of how much time has
passed, Article 12 does not prohibit a left-behind parent from
filing a Hague petition.
Turning next to the drafting history of the Convention, the
Second Circuit found support for its position in the history and
purpose of Article 12. The court concluded that equitable tolling
would be inconsistent with the treaty’s purpose. 121 It closely
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 349 Fed. Appx. 930, 931 (5th Cir. 2009).
117. Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189,196 (D.N.H. 2013).; see Dietz,
349 Fed. Appx. at 933 (stating simply and without further analysis that
“[b]oth ICARA and the Convention make no mention of equitable tolling, yet
it is well established in caselaw that it applies.”).
118. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013); Lozano v.
Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012).
119. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51.
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id.
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analyzed the report by Hague Conference Reporter Elisa PérezVera, in which Pérez-Vera stated that “a concern for children’s
‘true interests’ was the primary reason the signatory states ‘drew
up the Convention.’” 122 Based on the Pérez-Vera Report, the court
observed that “the Convention is not intended to promote the
return of a child to his or her country of habitual residency
irrespective of that child’s best interests; rather, the Convention
embodies the judgment that in most instances, a child’s welfare is
best served by a prompt return to that country.” 123 In assessing
the drafters’ intent with respect to equitable tolling, the court
noted the drafters’ consideration and ultimate rejection of
alternative proposals for shorter and longer time periods, and for
two time periods: one for cases in which the child was not
concealed, and a second, longer time period for cases in which the
child was concealed. 124
The Lozano court explained that the drafters explicitly
acknowledged the problem of concealment and that they viewed a
single, one-year time period as the “least bad” means of
reconciling the child’s interest in stability with the goal of
deterring child abductions. 125 The Second Circuit concluded that
“the Convention’s drafting history strongly supports [the] position
that the one-year period in Article 12 was designed to allow courts
to take into account a child’s interest in remaining in the country
to which she has been abducted after a certain amount of time has
passed.” 126 Equitable tolling, the court believed, would undermine
that purpose. 127
122. Id. (quoting Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 431, ¶¶ 23–24).
123. Id. at 53 (emphasis in the original).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 54.
127. Id. The court also noted that permitting equitable tolling in cases of
concealment would implicate “the inherent difficulty in having to prove the
existence of those problems which can surround the locating of [a] child.” Id.
In other words, permitting equitable tolling would introduce proof problems
related to whether, how, and for how long the abducting parent concealed the
child, and also related to the left-behind parent’s efforts to locate the child.
These evidentiary issues could prolong what is supposed to be a swift,
straight-forward hearing to effectuate or deny the return of an abducted
child. This is, in fact, exactly what happened in the Yaman case when the
parties introduced evidence relating to Linda’s efforts to conceal the children
Ozgur’s efforts to locate them. See Transcript of Bench Trial at 116-19,
Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 173; see also Transcript of Bench Trial
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The Second Circuit next addressed the contrary decisions
from the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 128 It explained that
the Eleventh Circuit permitted equitable tolling for two reasons:
first, to prevent rewarding a parent’s misconduct with an
affirmative defense and; second, because it believed that equitable
tolling should be read into every statute of limitations unless
Congress stated otherwise. 129 Finding both of these justifications
for equitable tolling unpersuasive, the Second Circuit stated that
the second argument failed because, “[u]nlike a statute of
limitations,” which would prohibit a parent from filing a return
petition after one year had expired, the well settled defense
“merely permits courts to consider the interests of a child” before
ordering the child’s return.130
The Eleventh Circuit’s first
justification failed, the Second Circuit explained, because “the
Convention expressly provided a mechanism other than equitable
tolling to avoid rewarding a parent’s misconduct—[the] discretion
to order the return of a child, even when a defense is satisfied.” 131
Thus, the availability of equitable discretion to return a settled
child, in the Second Circuit’s view, constituted a justification for
rejecting equitable tolling. The court, however, did not identify
the source of a court’s equitable discretion to return a settled child
or elaborate on what factors a court should consider in exercising
equitable discretion to return a settled child.
The First Circuit’s decision in Yaman tracked the Second
Circuit’s equitable tolling analysis, first addressing the text of the
Convention and then turning to its drafting history, Executive
Branch interpretations of Article 12, decisions of courts of other
signatory nations, and other federal circuit courts’ opinions. 132
The First Circuit joined the Second Circuit in concluding that the

at 3-16, 126-33, 139-40, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 170;
Transcript of Bench Trial at 53-73, 108-32, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 174.
128. Id. at 55.
129. Id. at 55.
130. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
131. Id. (quoting Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“[E]ven where the grounds for one of the ‘narrow’ exceptions ha[s] been
established, the district court is not necessarily bound to allow the child to
remain with the abducting parent.”).
132. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 2–16 (1st Cir. 2013).
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one-year time period in Article 12 could not be equitably tolled.133
Echoing the Second Circuit, it asserted that, “[e]ven if a child is
found ‘now settled,’ an authority retains discretion to weigh
against that finding of settledness considerations such as
concealment before deciding whether to order return.” 134 It
concluded that, although the time period may not be equitably
tolled, principles of equity come into play because the language of
Article 12 itself provides “a mechanism”—namely, equitable
discretion—“to prevent misconduct from being rewarded.” 135 The
First Circuit then provided a thorough explanation of its
conclusion that courts have equitable discretion to return a settled
child.136
The First Circuit is the only circuit court to date to provide an
in-depth analysis of the issues relating to equitable discretion. As
such, the Yaman case provides a useful framework for the next
section of this Article, which will use the Yaman opinion as a
starting point for explaining why, contrary to the First Circuit’s
conclusion, both the Convention and ICARA prohibit a court from
exercising equitable discretion to return a child deemed “settled”
in his new environment.
III. INTERPRETING THE HAGUE CONVENTION: WHY THE CONVENTION
PROHIBITS COURTS FROM EXERCISING EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO
RETURN A SETTLED CHILD

This section argues that the First Circuit erred in concluding
that a court may return a settled child pursuant to Article 12 of
the Convention. It argues that the First Circuit’s textual analysis
reflects a misreading of the Convention’s language; that the court
failed to properly interpret the drafting history of the Convention;
that the court did not analyze the legislative history of ICARA and
instead made incorrect assumptions about congressional intent;
and, finally, that the court misapprehended the thrust of decisions
from sister circuits and foreign courts, which do not provide as
strong support for a finding of equitable discretion as the First
Circuit suggested.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 12–22. This analysis is likely dicta, since it was not
essential to the court’s decision. See id.
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A. Textual Analysis
“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a
statute, begins with its text.” 137 Accordingly, in addressing
whether the district court in Yaman had equitable discretion to
return a settled child, the First Circuit started with the text of
Article 12.138 The court found textual support for equitable
discretion, observing that “[t]o say that an authority ‘shall’ order
return ‘unless’ a child is ‘now settled’ is not to say that an
authority is prohibited from ordering the child returned if
settledness is found.” 139 It acknowledged, but dismissed, the
traditional principle of statutory construction—on which the
district court relied—that Congress’s decision to omit a word or
phrase from one section of a statute, but to include that same
word or phrase in a closely related section of the same statute,
must be deemed purposeful. 140 Applying that principle, the
district court had reasoned that, if the drafters intended to grant
discretion to reject a properly established settled defense and
return a child anyway, they clearly knew how to do so, as
evidenced by express grants of discretion to reject properly proved
defenses under Articles 13 and 20. 141
The First Circuit then directly compared the text of Article 12
with the text of Articles 13 and 20,142 and concluded that a grant
of discretion to refuse the return of a settled child made sense in
the context of the Convention as a whole, stating, “[i]t is
consistent with the Convention’s overall structure that Article 12
leaves it within a court’s discretion whether to order the return of
a ‘now settled’ child.” 143 The court noted that the Convention
included “express requirements to order return” that corresponded
to the “express reservations of discretion” contained “elsewhere in
the Convention.” 144 It then argued by extension that because “the
137. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (quoting Medillín v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008)).
138. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Id. at 17.
144. Id. at 16–17 (“As we read them, Articles 13 and 20 contain express
reservations of discretion to refuse to order return so as to qualify the express
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Convention contains no express requirement to refuse to order the
return of a child ‘now settled,’ there is no need to expressly reserve
discretion so as to qualify any such requirement.” 145
The First Circuit’s analysis is flawed in several respects. The
Convention contains only one “express requirement[] to order
return”: the return remedy expressed in sentence one of Article 12.
That single express return requirement is qualified by defenses in
Articles 13, 20, and 12.146
While Articles 13 and 20 contain
148
147
Article 12 does not.
The First
discretionary language,
Circuit’s explanation for why Articles 13 and 20 contain
discretionary language, but Article 12 does not, is predicated on
the court’s incorrect assumption that the Article 13 and 20
defenses apply to separate return remedies. On the contrary, the
defenses in Articles 12, 13, and 20 all qualify the same return
remedy: the one set out in Article 12. Although the First Circuit is
undoubtedly correct that “unless” does not necessarily mean “shall
not,” it is equally true that, when compared to the clear language
of Articles 13 and 20, the absence of a prohibition on returning a
settled child cannot be understood as a grant of equitable
discretion to do so. A more straightforward reading of Article 12
suggests that the “unless” construction was intended as a
149
prohibition on returning a settled child.
requirements to order return contained elsewhere in the Convention.”).
145. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
146. See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 458 (characterizing the
settled defense as a “condition[]” that attaches to the return remedy in Article
12); id. at 459 (explaining that the obligation to return a child forthwith
“disappears whenever it can be shown that ‘the child is now settled in its
environment.’”).
147. Article 13 states “the judicial or administration authority . . . is not
bound to order the return of the child” if returning the child would expose the
child to “a grave risk . . . [of] physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation.” Hague Convention, supra note 46,
art. 13 (emphasis added). The language in Article 20 is similar: it states that
“[t]he return of the child . . . may be refused” if return would violate principles
of “human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Id. at art. 20 (emphasis added).
148. Article 12 states that, after one year, a child shall be returned unless
“the child is now settled in new environment.” Id. at art. 12.
149. Cf. Edwards v. Monumental, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1273 (D. Kan.
2011) (interpreting the phrase in an insurance policy, “We will not pay a
benefit for a Loss which is caused by, results from, or contributed to by taking
any drug, medication, narcotic, or hallucinogen, unless prescribed by a
Physician,” to mean that an individual was precluded from recovering under
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At least two Supreme Court Justices—preliminarily—read
Article 12 not as a grant of equitable discretion, but as requiring a
court to refuse to order the return of a child deemed settled.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Elena Kagan explained their
interpretation of the text of Article 12 during the Lozano oral
arguments on December 11, 2013. Both Justices indicated that
they viewed the second sentence in Article 12 as an express
prohibition on return when a child is deemed settled.150 Quoting
from the Convention, Scalia stated that he assumed the phrase
“shall order the return unless it is demonstrated that the child is
now settled” in sentence two of Article 12 means that, if the child
is settled, “you shall not order the return.” 151 Justice Kagan
agreed, stating that she interpreted Article 12 as follows: “[t]he
first clause says ‘shall’ and the second clause says ‘shall not.’”152
She conceded that “there is an alternate reading where the first
clause says ‘shall’ and the second clause essentially says ‘may or
may not at your discretion,’” but noted that such an interpretation
“would open up a big discretionary hole.” 153 The best reading of
Article 12 is as a prohibition on the return of a settled child. Even
assuming the text is ambiguous, however, the Convention’s
drafting history contravenes the First Circuit’s interpretation.
B. The Convention’s Drafting History
When the text of a treaty is ambiguous, a court is entitled to
invoke traditional rules of statutory construction. 154 It “may look

the plan for harm caused by substances taken “without the advice of a
physician” but not for harm caused by “the taking of a substance under the
advi[c]e of a physician”); Hovila v. Tween Brands, Inc., 2010 WL 1433417
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2010) (unpublished) (stating that the “common definition
of ‘unless’” required the court to conclude that the two categories following
the word “unless” in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act “describe
exceptions to the general rule requiring prior express consent before placing
an artificial or prerecorded call.”).
150. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Lozano v. Alvarez, 697
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-820_5368.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 38.
154. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (citations and
quotations omitted).
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beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
An
parties” to determine the meaning of the treaty. 155
examination of the drafting history of the Convention
demonstrates that the Convention prohibits courts and other
adjudicating authorities from exercising equitable discretion to
return a settled child.
1.

Analysis of Articles 12 and 18

The drafting history of Articles 12 and 18 supports the
conclusion that there is no residual discretion to return a settled
child under Article 12. The Convention’s primary objective is to
serve the best interests of the child, 156 and the drafters believed
emphatically that, in the usual case, enforcement of a foreign
custody order and deterrence of child abduction are in a child’s
best interest.157 At the same time, the drafters did not want the
Convention to become a vehicle for reexamining a foreign court’s
determination of a child’s best interests.158 As the Convention
155. Id.
156. See id. at 172 (“Above all, it is obvious that the efforts made by the
Hague Conference with a view to combat the international abduction of
children are inspired by a desire to protect the interests of such children.”).
157. Id. (“Now, among the most objective aspects of that general interest
of the child, there is the right not to be removed or retained in the name of a
more or less questionable right over his person.”)(empahasis added).
158. See, e.g., Summary of findings on a Questionnaire studied by
International Social Service, Preliminary Document No 3 of February 1979”
[ISS Summary], in Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 182 (noting that
though many countries apply the legal standard of “the best interests of the
child” in making custody decisions, “it has appeared . . . that ‘the best
interests of the child’ are valued differently in the various cultures. In some
countries the religious education plays an important part . . . Furthermore, it
is not clear whether the ‘interests’ of the child to be served are those of the
immediate aftermath of the decision, of the adolescence of the child, of young
adulthood, maturity, senescence or old age!”); Report of the Special
Commission by Elisa Pérez-Vera, in Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 178
(“As to the import of the return which is favoured by the Convention, we
should point out that it does not settle, or seek to settle, the question of
custodial rights.”); Report of the Special Commission by Elisa Pérez-Vera, in
Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 182 (“[T]he domestic jurisdictions have
often in the past granted the custody in litigation to the person who has
unlawfully removed or retained the child, and this in the name of the child’s
interest. Often too, this decision seemed the best one to take, but we cannot
ignore the fact that when internal authorities think in such a way they run
the risk of expressing a particularism, be it cultural, social or other, of a
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Reporter explained, the “best interests of the child” standard is so
vague that it “resemble[s] more closely a sociological paradigm
159
Aware that making a
than a concrete juridical standard.”
custody determination in the best interests of the child would
require a court to “delv[e] into the assumptions concerning the
ultimate interests of a child which are derived from the moral
framework of a particular culture,” 160 the drafters included a
provision in the treaty explicitly forbidding a state from deciding
the merits of a custody decision until a petition for return has
been denied.161 A decision pursuant to the Convention, therefore,
does not constitute a decision on the merits of a custody dispute.
Nothing in Article 12 or 18 undercuts the drafters’ intention
to proscribe signatories from addressing the merits of a custody
dispute pursuant to the Convention. Pérez-Vera noted that the
decision on the appropriate time period in Article 12 “during
which the authorities concerned must order the return of the child
forthwith” 162 was important because, to the extent that the return
of an abducted child is presumed to be in the child’s best interest,
“it is clear that after a child has become settled in its new
environment, its return should take place only after an
examination of the merits of the custody rights exercised over it—
something which is outside the scope of the Convention.”163
Pérez-Vera stated in her report that Articles 12 and 18 together
address the “[d]uty to return the child” and “can be examined
together since they complement each other.” 164 According to
Pérez-Vera, Article 12 “highlights two cases”: (1) the duty to
return where a petition has been filed within one year of
abduction; and (2) “the conditions which attach to this duty where
an application is submitted after the aforementioned timelimit.” 165
certain national community, thus, really, making a very subjective judgment
on the other national community from which the child has been pulled.”).
159. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 431, ¶ 21.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Hague Convention, supra note 46, at art. 16. ICARA also forbids a
United States court from determining the merits of any underlying custody
dispute. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2013).
162. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 458, ¶ 107
163. Id.
164. Id. at 458, ¶ 106.
165. Id.
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Rather than contradict the Convention’s prohibition on merits
decisions, Article 18 supports it. It states, “[t]he provisions of this
Chapter do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative
authority to order the return of the child at any time,” 166 and is
simply a reminder that signatories may apply their own domestic
laws to reevaluate the merits of a custody dispute after finding
that a child is settled. Some drafters felt that Article 18 was
unnecessary; they thought it obvious that the Convention did not
prevent states from applying their own domestic law. They
considered eliminating it, noting that “there is always, even in the
absence of a convention, the possibility of prescribing the child’s
return, after the affair has been examined on its merits.” 167 In
discussing Article 18, Pérez-Vera noted specifically that provisions
of domestic law may be invoked “particularly in the situations
envisaged in the second paragraph of article 12” where the return
order is refused because the child is settled in its new
environment.168 Importantly, the United States’ delegate the
conference understood Article 18 “as a facultative provision,”169
intended only to make clear that the remedies provided by the
Convention were not exclusive.
Article 18, thus, did not confer the power to return a child
after the expiration of the one-year time period in Article 12.170
Nor did it leave a “residual power in judges after the expiration of
the time-limits in Article [12].” 171 It “merely implied [that
authorities] could use whatever proceedings or powers they
possessed in domestic law,” 172 especially in cases where a child
173
Article 18 “underlines the nonhad been deemed “settled.”
exhaustive and complementary nature of the Convention” and
“authorizes the competent authorities to order the return of the
child by invoking other provisions more favourable to the
attainment of this end.” 174 Those “other provisions,” must be
166. Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 18.
167. Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 202, ¶ 92.
168. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460, ¶ 112.
169. Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 295.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460, ¶ 112.
174. Id. The text of ICARA reinforces this understanding. ICARA states:
“Remedies under the Convention [are] not exclusive. The remedies
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found—if at all—in domestic law and not in the text of the
Convention. When read in the context of the Convention’s
drafting history, it is clear that neither Article 12 nor Article 18
supports the conclusion that a court has equitable discretion
pursuant to the Convention to return a settled child. Articles 13
and 20 reinforce this conclusion.
2.

Analysis of Articles 13 and 20

The drafting history of Articles 13 and 20 further illustrates
that Article 12 does not grant a court equitable discretion to
return a settled child. Just as the Pérez-Vera report considered
Articles 12 and 18 together, 175 it also considered Articles 13 and
20 together, captioning the section discussing them: “[p]ossible
176
This organization
exceptions to the return of the child.”
suggests that the drafters understood the Article 12 settled
defense as different in kind from the defenses available under
Articles 13 and 20, though they all provided exceptions to the
same return remedy. Pérez-Vera noted that “the exceptions in
these two articles do not apply automatically, in that they do not
invariably result in the child’s retention.” 177 Rather, “the very
nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion—and does not
impose upon them a duty—to refuse to return a child in certain
circumstances.” 178 Perez-Vera made no similar observation
regarding the settled defense in Article 12.
In the context of the Convention drafters’ goals and concerns,
it makes sense that the drafters granted authorities discretion to
return a child in the face of a successful Article 13 or 20 defense,
but not after a determination that a child is settled; these defenses
serve different purposes. The defenses available in Articles 13
and 20, and the discretion granted to a court to reject them, reflect
the “fragile compromise[s] reached during the deliberations of the
Special Commission.” 179 As to Article 13, it “was not intended to
established by the Convention and this chapter shall be in addition to
remedies available under other laws or international agreements.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(h) (2013).
175. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460 ¶ 106
176
Id. at 460 para. 3.
177. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460, ¶ 113.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 460, ¶ 116.
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be used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the
child’s best interests.” 180 To that end, “[o]nly evidence directly
establishing the existence of a grave risk that would expose the
child to physical or emotional harm or otherwise place the child in
an intolerable situation is material to the court’s
determination.” 181 The child’s interest in return to his habitual
residence gives way only when return would expose the child to
“physical or psychological danger” or “an intolerable situation.” 182
Article 13, in other words, is not a back-door to a merits hearing
on custody rights.
Similarly, the Article 20 defense is to be narrowly construed.
It is available only when “the fundamental principles of the
requested State . . . do not permit” return. 183 “[I]t will not be
sufficient to show merely that its return would be incompatible,
even manifestly incompatible, with these principles.” 184 Rather,
for return to be rejected under Article 20, return must be
prohibited by the requested states’ internal law. 185 This provision
“was the result of a compromise between those delegates which
favoured, and those which were opposed to, the inclusion of a
‘public policy’ clause.” 186 These defenses threatened to render the
Convention a “dead letter” 187 because they implicated judgments
about foreign countries’ political, cultural, and religious traditions.
The drafters accordingly intended them to be narrowly construed;
hence, they incorporated grants of discretion to reject a successful
defense under either Article. 188

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 433, ¶ 30.
183. Id. at 461–62, ¶ 118.
184. Id.
185. Id.
[E]ven if its literal meaning is strongly reminiscent of the
terminology used in international texts concerning the protection of
human rights, this particular rule is not directed at developments
which have occurred on the international level, but is concerned only
with the principles accepted by the law of the requested state, either
through general international and treaty law, or through internal
legislation.
Id.
186. Id. at 433–34, ¶ 31.
187. Id. at 434–35, ¶ 34.
188. See State Department Analysis, supra note 70, at 10510.
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Article 12, by contrast, does not similarly implicate political or
cultural judgments. Rather, it allows for a basically objective
examination of a child’s status as settled, or not, in his new
environment.189 It permits examination of a child’s life in the
country to which the child was abducted and allows a court to
determine whether the child would be better off—because he is
settled where he is—remaining in that country while the parents
dispute their custody rights, rather than being forcibly returned to
the country from which he was abducted, only to face a heightened
possibility of being subsequently returned to the country to which
he was abducted and where he is “now settled.” The Article 12
settled defense and the one-year time period reflect the fact that
the Convention’s overarching goal was to protect a child’s best
interests, and that the drafters viewed returning a settled child as
tantamount to treating the child as a “yo-yo.” 190
The foregoing discussion of the drafting histories of Articles
12, 18, 13, and 20 demonstrates that the discretion available to
return a child in the face of a viable Article 13 or Article 20
defense is unavailable under Article 12, and that Article 18 does
not represent a grant of equitable discretion to return a settled
child.
A determination of settledness neither requires an
assessment of the child’s ultimate best interests nor invites
judgment regarding another signatory’s social and cultural values;
it simply permits the court to examine the child’s degree of
acclimation to her new environment, and if the child is deemed
settled, requires the parties to litigate their custody dispute in the
189. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“Among the factors that courts have considered in determining whether or
not a child has become settled are: ‘the age of the child[;] the stability of the
child's residence in the new environment[;] whether the child attends school
or day care consistently[;] whether the child attends church [or other
religious institutions] regularly[;] the stability of the mother's employment[;]
and whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area.’”) (quoting
In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)); In re Filipczak, 513 Fed.
Appx. 16, 19 (2d Cir. Feb. 27 2013) (stating that the Article 12 settledness
standard “does not call for determining in which location the child is
relatively better settled, but rather for determining whether the child has
become so settled in a new environment that repatriation would be against
the child’s best interest”).
190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12820_5368.pdf.
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country where the child presently resides.
C. Decisions from sister circuits and foreign courts
1.

Sister circuits

Both the First and Second Circuits purported to find support
for equitable discretion in decisions by sister circuits. 191 For
example, the First Circuit stated that “[w]hile no other circuit has
addressed the ‘now settled’ defense in particular,” “[o]ther circuits
agree that the Convention confers upon a federal district court the
authority to order return even if a party establishes a ‘now settled’
defense.” 192 Notwithstanding the fact that these two statements
are contradictory, neither the First nor the Second Circuit
identified cases that are actually relevant to the question of
whether courts possess equitable discretion pursuant to Article 12,
as opposed to Articles 13 and 20. In fact, all of the cases that the
First and Second Circuit cite trace back to the State Department’s
legal analysis of Articles 13 and 20, and not Article 12. As already
discussed, Articles 13 and 20, unlike Article 12, contain
discretionary language by their own terms.
The Second Circuit, for example, found support for its finding
of equitable discretion in Blondin v. Dubois, another Second
Circuit decision. Blondin, however, involved the Article 13 grave
risk defense. 193 In that case, the court stated that “[e]ven where
the grounds for one of the ‘narrow’ exceptions ha[s] been
established, the district court is not necessarily bound to allow the
child to remain with the abducting parent.” 194 The Blondin panel
in turn supported its statement with a Sixth Circuit case,
Friedrich v. Friedrich, which stated in the context of the Article 13
191. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 55 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Blondin v.
Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999) (addressing the Article 13 grave
risk defense)); Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995) (addressing an Article
13 defense); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996)
(addressing the discretion available to a court when a party raises an Article
13 or 20 defense); and Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402 (4th Cir. 2001)
(addressing Article 13)).
192. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 20 (“Numerous circuits accept the general
proposition that ‘courts retain the discretion to order return even if one of the
[Convention’s] exceptions is proven.”).
193. 189 F.3d at 246 n.4.
194.
Id.
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and 20 defenses that “a federal court retains, and should use when
appropriate, the discretion to return a child, despite the existence
of a defense, if return would further the aims of the
Convention.” 195
The Friedrich court rooted its claim to discretion in a Third
Circuit case, Feder v. Evans-Feder, 196 in which the Third Circuit
stated that “courts retain the discretion to order return even if one
of the exceptions is proven.” 197 Feder, however, also implicated an
Article 13 defense—and not the Article 12 well-settled defense.198
The Feder court properly cited the Federal Register for support,
which states that “a finding that one or more of the exceptions
provided by Articles 13 and 20 are applicable does not make
refusal of a return order mandatory. The courts retain the
discretion to order the child returned even if they consider that
one or more of the exceptions applies.” 199 While this analysis is
undoubtedly true of those two articles, it says nothing about any
equitable power that might exist under Article 12 to return a
settled child. Instead of demonstrating why any equitable powers
might exist under Article 12, these cases merely affirm the
existence of discretionary authority pursuant to Articles 13 and
20. After tracing the Lozano and Yaman courts’ citation trails
back to their origins, it is clear that no circuit court opinion can
carry the weight the First and Second Circuits ask it to bear.
2.

Foreign courts

The opinions of sister signatories are “entitled to great
weight,” 200 especially where, as here, Congress has expressly
affirmed the value of uniform treaty interpretation in the text of
the implementing legislation. 201 Foreign court decisions regarding
equitable discretion to return a settled child pursuant to the
195. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067 (citing Feder 63 F.3d at 226).
196. 63 F.3d at 226.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 221 (noting that the respondent argued her child faced a
“grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm” and an “intolerable situation”
if returned to Australia). The First Circuit cited to Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d
392, 402 (4th Cir. 2001), which relied on Feder in discussing Article 13. See
also Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2013).
199. State Department Analysis, supra note 70, at 10509.
200. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 67 (2010).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B) (2013).

ROSSIANDSTARKFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2014 12:08 PM

136 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:106
Convention point in both directions. The Yaman court found
support in decisions by the Court of Appeals for England and
Wales, the Supreme Court of Ireland, and an analysis by the
British House of Lords in In re M.202 The First Circuit, however,
failed to acknowledge the persuasive limits of these cases and
ignored decisions from foreign courts that reached the opposite
conclusion.
For example, while the British House of Lords in In re M
ultimately agreed that the Convention does grant equitable
discretion to return a settled child, the majority reached its
conclusion “not without considerable hesitation.” 203 One judge
dissented, stating that “once a child has become settled, precisely
because the purpose of the Convention to promote speedy return
can no longer be achieved, the Convention ceases to play a role.
Then, as article 18 envisages, the court is to have resort to its
powers outside the Convention.” 204
The In re M majority
acknowledged this point, stating that “[i]n settlement cases . . .
the major objective of the Convention cannot be achieved. . . . It
cannot any longer be assumed that that country is the better
forum for the resolution of the parental dispute.” 205 Even after
concluding that it had discretion to return a settled child,
however, the House of Lords declined to exercise it, stating that
“the policy of the Convention can carry little weight” 206 against
“powerful child-centric considerations.” 207 Because of the father’s
delay in filing a Hague petition, the Convention’s “primary
objective cannot be fulfilled,” and “[t]hese children should not be
made to suffer for the sake of general deterrence of the evil of
child abduction world wide.” 208
The First Circuit cited a case from the Supreme Court of
Ireland, in which that court “arrived at a similar conclusion” and
inferred a grant of discretion from Article 18. 209 The Irish court,
202. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 20.
203. See In re M, [2007] UKHL 55, A.C. (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt
/jd071205/inrem%20-1.htm.
204. Id. at ¶ 7.
205. Id. at ¶ 47.
206. Id. at ¶ 54.
207. Id. at ¶ 53.
208. Id. at ¶ 54.
209. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing P. v.
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however, did not undertake an in-depth analysis of the equitable
discretion issue and merely stated in a conclusory fashion that
“this Court has a discretion as to whether to order [the child’s]
return to Spain.” 210
Further weakening the First Circuit’s efforts to rely on
support from the courts of other signatories are decisions from at
least three foreign courts that have held that the Convention does
not grant discretion to return a settled child. For example, an
Australian court has stated:
[W]hile there is some suggestion in some English cases
that a finding of “settled in a new environment” still
leaves a discretion in the court to order the return of a
child, I must respectfully disagree with those views. If
those views are simply saying that by operation of
common law or local statute law, as distinct from Hague
Convention law, the court has jurisdiction to order the
return of a child, then there is no dispute between myself
and the other learned judges. If, however, it is suggested
that within the four walls of the Hague Convention there
is room for discretion in respect of a child who has met
the criteria of being more than one year away from the
wrongful retention or removal and now settled in its new
environment, then in my view there is no such room. 211
The court continued by analyzing the function of Article 18:
Art[icle] 18 does no more than indicate that the
Convention makes up part of the law of a country
exercising Convention powers and that it does not seek to
codify the entire law relating to dealings with children
about whom it is argued there are jurisdictional questions
or about whom it is argued their welfare requires them to
be taken to another country. In my view, if I concluded
B., [1999] 4 I.R. 185; [1999] 2 I.L.R.M. 401(Ir.), available at http://
www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0391.htm).
210. P. v. B., [1999] 4 I.R. 185; [1999] 2 I.L.R.M. 401(Ir.), available at
http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0391.htm.
211. State Central Authority v. Ayob, [1997] 21 Fam LR 567 (Austl.),
available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0232.htm. The Australian
court confirmed this view in 2005. See FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL
REPORT 2005–2006 81, available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/
resources/file/eb52a50eee4dced/Part_5_Significant_Judgments_AR06.pdf.
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that this was a Hague child who had been wrongfully
removed or retained, and that more than one year had
passed prior to application being made, and I was
satisfied the child was settled in her new environment,
that would be the end of the matter under the Hague
Convention and under the Regulations. 212
Courts in Hong Kong 213 and Canada 214 also have concluded
that they lack discretion under the Convention to return a settled
child. Although New Zealand courts have concluded that they do
have discretion to return a settled child, that power arises under
the Care of Children Act of 2004—which implemented the
Convention in New Zealand—and expressly provides for such
discretion.215 Thus, at the very least, the First Circuit in Yaman
overstated the extent to which decisions from foreign courts
support its conclusion.
Because the Convention itself did not authorize states parties
to return a settled child, a court may take such action only if it
otherwise has the power to do so, for example, if its domestic
implementing legislation permits it—as in New Zealand. 216 Thus,
the next question this Article addresses is whether ICARA, the
Convention’s implementing legislation in the United States,
granted courts in the United States jurisdiction to return a settled
child.
IV. ICARA DOES NOT EXPAND THE JURISDICTIONAL GRANT IN THE
HAGUE CONVENTION.

The First Circuit argued that it did. It stated that a court’s
“power to order the return of a settled child” stems from “federal

212. Id.
213. See Summary of A.C. v. P.C., Hague Conference on Private
International Law, INCADAT, available at http://www.incadat.
com/index.cfm?act=search.detail&cid=825&lng=1&sl=1.
214. See Droit de la Famille 2785, No. 500-09-005532-973, [1995]
INCADAT 653, (Can. Q.C.C.A.), available at http://www.incadat.com/
index.cfm?act=search.detail&cid=653&lng=1&sl=2.
215. See Care of Child Act 2004 § 106(1)(a) (N.Z.) (“[T]he court may refuse
to make an order . . . for the return of the child if . . . the child is now settled
in his or her new environment . . . ”).
216. See id.
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courts’ broad equitable powers” 217 and the federal government’s
traditional role in “decisions bearing on foreign relations.” 218 The
court asserted that ICARA—though not the Convention itself—
grants federal courts the power to return an abducted child, so
that the court “assume[d]” that, in granting federal courts that
power, Congress necessarily intended for federal courts “to bring
their full toolkit to the assignment.” 219 It acknowledged the
district court’s position that “a parent seeking the return of a
settled child must go to state court (or convince a federal court to
exercise pendant jurisdiction),” but expressed “doubt[] that
Congress intended for this traditional separation of authority to
apply in cases of international child abduction, which are matters
220
not just of family law but also of international relations.”
The
court, however, did not include any analysis of the legislative
history of ICARA, which makes it clear that the jurisdictional
grant in ICARA is coextensive with the powers conferred by the
Convention and did not grant United States courts additional
power to return a settled child.
An understanding of core principles of federal jurisdiction,
including especially the so-called “domestic relations exception,” is
necessary to accurately assess the powers granted by the Hague
Convention and ICARA. Federal courts derive their power to hear
221
and decide cases from both the Constitution and Congress.
Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution states that the federal
judicial power lies in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish,” 222 and reflects the “Madisonian Compromise”—which
is “the standard view that the Constitution does not require
Congress to create or to vest jurisdiction in any federal court
except the Supreme Court.” 223 Article III, Section 2 establishes
the outer limit of federal court jurisdiction. 224 Congress thus has

217. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2013).
218. Id. at 18.
219. Id. at 17.
220. Id. at 18.
221. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 442 (1850).
222. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
223. Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive
Detention at Guantanamo?, 85 N.Y.U.L. REV. 535, 535 (2010).
224. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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plenary power to determine the scope of the federal courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction 225 within the parameters of Article III, Section
2. 226
Under these principles, “[b]oth the Constitution and an act of
Congress must concur in conferring power upon the Circuit
Courts,” 227 and Congress may withhold jurisdiction over matters
“in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem
proper for the public good.” 228 Relevant here is the Constitution’s
grant of jurisdiction to cases “arising under . . . treaties” 229 such as
the Hague Convention, and the jurisdictional grant in ICARA,
which provided both state and federal courts with “concurrent
original jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention,” 230
and “empower[ed]” them “to determine only rights under the
Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody
claims.” 231
The domestic relations exception is a principle of federal court
jurisdiction, which states that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of United States.” 232 The
domestic relations exception is not rooted in the Constitution.233
Instead, it is a “construction of the diversity statute.” 234 Pursuant
225. Dating back at least to 1850, it has been black-letter law that the
contingent nature of the lower federal courts implies the power to limit their
jurisdiction. See Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 446.
226. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (stating that
Article III “delineates the absolute limits on federal courts’ jurisdiction.”).
227. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 442.
228. Id. (holding “the courts cannot exercise jurisdiction in every case to
which the judicial power extends, without the intervention of Congress, who
are not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every
subject which the Constitution might warrant.”).
229. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2013).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2013).
232. Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–594 (1890); Ankenbrandt, 504
U.S. at 694-95 (holding that the domestic relations exception divests federal
courts of authority to hear custody disputes).
233. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 695 (“An examination of Article III, Barber
itself, and our cases since Barber makes clear that the Constitution does not
exclude domestic relations cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by
statute to the federal courts.”).
234. Id. at 700–01 (noting that “where Congress made substantive
changes to the [diversity] statute in other respects . . . we presume, absent
any indication that Congress intended to alter this exception . . . that
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to it, Congress “divest[ed] the federal courts of power to issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” 235 The rule is
“supported by sound policy considerations,” 236 as state courts have
developed substantial expertise in divorce, alimony, and child
custody decisions over time. 237
Congress was acutely aware of the challenges associated with
drafting implementing legislation for an international treaty that
dealt with domestic relations and child custody issues. 238 In
considering whether to grant federal courts original concurrent
jurisdiction of Hague cases, Congress recognized the unique
challenges posed by the United States’ federalist system and
debated how best to keep family law matters out of federal court.
Specifically, it considered whether federal courts should have
original concurrent jurisdiction to hear Hague cases. The House
of Representatives proposed a version of the law that permitted
only state courts to hear Hague Convention cases. Supporters of
this version looked to the domestic relations exception for support.
Kevin R. Jones, representing the Department of Justice, testified

Congress ‘adopt[ed] that interpretation’ when it reenacted the diversity
statute.”).
235. Id. at 703 (stating that “[g]iven the long passage of time without any
expression of congressional dissatisfaction” the court reaffirmed the
exception).
236. Id. at 704 (holding that the domestic relations exception divests
federal courts of authority to hear custody disputes).
237. Id.
238. Congress has applied the domestic relations exception in drafting
other federal statutes. For example, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
(“SIJS”) is an immigration benefit available to youth under twenty-one years
of age who have been “abused, abandoned, and neglected” by one or both of
their parents. INA § 101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. §
204.11(c) (2011). Though it is “[u]nquestionably” true that federal authority
over immigration is “plenary and exclusive,” Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 26
(1982), in order for a child to become eligible for SIJS, he “must first seek a
predicate or special findings order from a state court.” Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (January 2011) (emphasis
added). The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) presented similar
issues. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE'S 1991 YEAR-END REPORT
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (1992) (lamenting that VAWA “would
unnecessarily expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts” and “could involve
the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes.”). In light of
these concerns, VAWA was drafted to “protect state prerogatives and the
federal docket.”
Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1315 (1998).
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that granting federal courts any role at all in ICARA cases would
violate the domestic relations exception and that jurisdiction
should be withheld for that reason. He drew an analogy to the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (“PKPA”), arguing
that although legal issues arising under ICARA originate in
federal law, the substance of the issues is quintessentially family
law, and therefore Hague cases should remain in state courts.239
The legislative debate also included discussion of Thompson v.
Thompson, a Supreme Court case decided the same year that
ICARA was enacted. 240 In Thompson, the Court was asked to
decide whether PKPA granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear
PKPA cases. The Court concluded that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear disputes under PKPA for two central reasons:
first, because the legislative history indicated that Congress had
considered and ultimately rejected a jurisdictional grant to federal
courts; and, second, because PKPA cases involved domestic
relations matters and should therefore be reserved for more
experienced state courts. 241 “Instructing the federal courts to play
Solomon,” the Court wrote, “would entangle them in traditional
state law questions that they have little expertise to resolve.”242
Recognizing the domestic relations exception, the Court stated
that even preliminary decisions on jurisdiction made by federal
courts under PKPA could “involve the federal courts in
substantive domestic relations determinations,” since jurisdiction
can turn on “the child’s ‘best interest’ or on proof that the child
has been abandoned or abused.” 243
Such considerations applied with equal force to ICARA,
according to the DOJ. “Just as with PKPA,” Jones maintained,
disputes arising under ICARA would “require courts to consider

239. A Bill to Facilitate Implementation of the 1980 Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and for Other Purposes:
Hearing on S. 1347 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 74 (1988) (Responses to Written
Questions submitted by the Subcommittee, Thomas Boyd, Acting Assistant
Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter Hearing before the S.
Subcommittee].
240. See 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
241. Id. at 174, 175–76.
242. Id. at 186.
243. Id. at 176–77.
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traditional domestic relations inquiries.” 244 Pointing to the settled
exception in Article 12 of the Convention, Jones argued that such
“fact specific” issues would “turn on the circumstances of the
child,” which only state courts should address. 245 Just because the
legal standards are codified in an international convention, Jones
argued, “does not change the fact that the principles expressed in
them are akin to traditional domestic relations matters.” 246
Jones also contended that state courts were more competent
than federal courts to hear ICARA cases because they have
traditionally had concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under
international treaties and are accustomed to interpreting and
applying international law and to adjudicating questions of family
law. 247 Moreover, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Enforcement Act 248 already empowered states to interpret and
enforce foreign custody orders. 249
244. Hearing before the S. Subcommittee, supra note 239, at 60
(statement of Kevin R. Jones, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Legal
Policy, Department of Justice).
245. Id. at 61.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 74 (citing Responses to Written Questions submitted by the
Subcommittee, Thomas Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the
United States)
. . . until 1980, jurisdiction in the district courts under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 was limited to cases involving a jurisdictional minimum
amount. Thus, until 1980, even if a claim arose under a treaty or
other federal law, but involved less than $10,000, the claim would be
resolved in state court . . . [e]ven today, where a case involves a
federal issue . . . but the cause of cause of action does not ‘arise
under’ a federal law or treaty . . . such federal law issues are
routinely encountered and resolved in the state courts.
Id.
248. See generally Applicability and Application of Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to International Child
Custody and Support Actions, 66 A.L.R. 269 (6th ed. 2011) (explaining that
the UCCJEA, adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia,
“establishes the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over a child custody matter”
and that “[f]oreign child custody or protection orders are now frequently
recognized and enforced under the doctrine of comity, with state courts
considering foreign countries as if they were states of the United States for
jurisdictional purposes under the UCCJEA”); see also Child Custody
Jurisdiction
and
Enforcement
Act,
Uniform Law
Commission,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction
%20and%20Enforcement%20Act.
249. Hearing before the S. Subcommittee, supra note 239, at 74.
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Commenting on the House version of the law, Senator Byrd
observed, “The reason that the House constructed this approach
was out of concern that these cases would embroil the Federal
courts in deciding child custody matters. I must say that I
understand this concern . . . [N]one of the proponents of this
bill . . . want[s] to see the Federal courts [] involved in deciding the
underlying custody disputes.” 250 Byrd argued, however, that,
although Hague Convention cases involve “an underlying concern
of child custody,” 251 because those cases would arise under an
international treaty, parties would inevitably seek removal to
federal court, thereby embroiling the parties in protracted
litigation that would unnecessarily prolong what was meant to be
a quick and efficient hearing. 252 Byrd therefore introduced an
alternative version of the law that granted concurrent original
jurisdiction to federal courts and was intended to forestall
protracted litigation over jurisdictional issues that could delay
resolution of Hague cases. 253
Co-chairman of the Child Custody Committee of the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association, Patricia M. Hoff,
also testified. She argued for concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction and sought to diminish the relevance of the domestic
relations exception.
“Federal judges,” she argued, “have
successfully adjudicated the tort claims stemming from parental
kidnapping without becoming enmeshed in the merits of the
underlying custody dispute.” 254 They are equally able, she argued,
to handle international abduction cases without becoming marred
in child custody issues. Moreover, cases involving citizens of
different countries implicated a heightened need for federal court
250. Id.
251. Procedures to Implement the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 134 CONG. REC. S3839, 3839-40 (daily ed. Apr.
12, 1988).
252. Id.
253. See id. (Senator Dixon advocated for “clear language on this sensitive
matter of jurisdiction,” clarity necessary to avoid “an endless series of
litigation” on the availability of federal forums in Hague Convention cases).
254. International Child Abduction Act: Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R.
3971 before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 65 (1988) (testimony of Patricia M.
Hoff, Co-Chairman, Child Custody Committee of the Family Law Section,
American Bar Association) [hereinafter Hearing Before the H.R.
Subcommittee].
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jurisdiction that could neutralize “the spectre of local bias.”255
Ultimately, Congress voted to grant both state and federal courts
original concurrent jurisdiction, 256 concluding that it made sense
to grant state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to avoid
litigation over jurisdictional questions in light of the fact that,
under ICARA, “the issues of treaty interpretation and child
custody are inseparably combined.” 257
Congress, however, still wanted to ensure that the language
of the proposed implementing legislation sufficiently cabined child
custody issues. 258 For example, Senator Hatch sought to identify
the specific “custody-related questions that may arise in the
context of disputes under the Hague Convention.” 259 He listed
five situations involving “traditional[] custody-related matters
handled by the States” that would arise under the Convention.260
Those matters were:
[W]hether or not a child has settled into its new
environment, whether or not there is a grave risk that
return of a child would expose him or her to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation, whether or not the parent from
whom the child was taken was exercising rights of
custody or had acquiesced in the removal of the child,
whether or not the child has attained the age and degree
of maturity at which it is appropriate [to] take account of
its views, and whether or not any custody determinations
have been rendered in the count[r]y receiving the request
for the child’s return. 261
Senator Dixon confirmed that this list constituted “the extent
of custody-type issues permitted under the Hague Convention.”262

255. International Child Abduction Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 66 (1998) (statement of Patricia M. Hoff, Co-Chairman, Child
Custody Comm. of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association).
256. 134 CONG. REC. 6482.
257. Id. at 6484.
258. See id. at 6482–84.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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Thus, to the extent an outcome of a Hague case would require a
“custody-type” decision other than those listed above, ICARA was
presumed to prohibit it. An exercise of equitable discretion to
return a settled child is outside the scope of those decisions which
Congress authorized the federal courts to consider.
V. EXERCISING EQUITABLE DISCRETION CONTRAVENES THE DRAFTERS’
AND CONGRESS’ INTENT

A. Equitable Discretion invites a prohibited “custody-type”
inquiry
In practice, the exercise of equitable discretion, even when
“not [] free-wheeling,” 263 encroaches on areas of family law outside
of the limits set by ICARA and the Convention. The Yaman and
Lozano cases provide apt examples of why returning a settled
child provokes litigation that mirrors in substance the merits of a
custody decision—even if it does not result in a comprehensive
custody hearing—and involves federal courts in domestic relations
matters outside of what either the Convention or ICARA
authorizes.
In Yaman, Ozgur argued that equitable discretion was
appropriate given Linda’s “poor judgment” and its negative impact
on the girls. 264 Under his view, any “proper analysis” of whether
to exercise equitable discretion required consideration of “the
interests of the children and their ability to thrive in a stable
environment.” 265 These factors are the same types of factors that
a family court considers when deciding child custody disputes, and
are alien to cases under the Convention and ICARA. 266 For
example, New Hampshire courts consider “[t]he conduct of the
parties” and “the ability of the parents to promote the welfare of
the children” 267 in making custody decisions. Ozgur’s argument is
an apt illustration of the Pandora’s Box of domestic relations
263. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 (statement
of Assistant Solicitor General), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-820_5368.pdf.
264. Transcript of Bench Trial at 79, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF
No. 165.
265. Brief for the Appellant at 67, Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2013), Document No. 00116536505.
266. See Del Pozzo v. Del Pozzo, 309 A.2d 151, 152 (N.H. 1973).
267. Id. at 153.
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issues that is opened through the exercise of equitable discretion.
It impermissibly invites federal courts to consider factors that
Congress explicitly sought to exclude from ICARA cases and that
the domestic relations exception removes from federal jurisdiction.
The First Circuit’s contention that it possesses equitable
discretion under the Convention and ICARA is belied by the
practical implications of its exercise. 268
B. Equitable Discretion impermissibly requires courts to ignore
the drafters’ carefully negotiated compromises
In Lozano, the Solicitor General attempted to identify the
factors that a court may consider when applying equitable
discretion.269 She argued that if a child is deemed settled, there is
no obligation to return the child, but that the court must instead
conduct an inquiry that is “guided by the objectives of the
treaty.” 270 This open-ended standard, she claimed, should reflect
the fact that the Convention “is really geared in the first place
toward preventing abduction.” 271
This view contravenes the drafters’ intent because it invites
courts to rebalance the objectives that the Convention drafters
carefully weighed when drafting Article 12 and, especially, the
one-year time period in which return “forthwith” is the prescribed
remedy. As described above, the Convention’s drafters concluded
that, after a year, if a child is settled, the child should not be
uprooted, either for the sake of preventing abductions 272 or for any
268. Additionally, neither court acknowledged the fact that these
considerations are the same ones that will inevitably be litigated during the
actual custody hearing. Raising them in the context of a Hague petition
contravenes the intent of the drafters and Congress to ensure that a Hague
proceeding is quick, efficient, and narrow, and that it does not morph into a
custody hearing by another name.
269. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Lozano v. Alvarez, No. 12820, 2013 WL 2280948, at *11–15 (U.S. May 24, 2013).
270. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12820_5368.pdf.
271. Id.
272. Although “there might in theory be some general deterrent effect
against clever abductors if they know that they couldn’t claim the benefit of
settledness if they concealed the location of the child,” the deterrent effect is
speculative and likely to be limited. Transcript of Bench Trial at 79-80,
Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 165.
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other reason. To do otherwise, as the district court stated in its
bench ruling in Yaman, “would be to treat children like chattel,
which they aren’t.” 273 The drafters decided that the child’s wellbeing, once the child is settled and a year has passed, must not be
compromised, notwithstanding the Convention’s objective to deter
child abductions. As explained above, the drafting history
demonstrates that the drafters knew they were drawing a line
that represented the “least bad” 274 solution to the problem of
competing interests, specifically, a child’s interest in not being
repeatedly uprooted—treated like a “yo-yo” 275—and the drafters’
goal of deterring child abductions and concealment. To recast the
Convention as being “really geared in the first place toward
preventing abduction” 276 is to rewrite and undo the priorities
agreed upon by the drafters. The Lozano case illustrates that
exercising equitable discretion to return a settled child invites a
court to reevaluate policy questions that the drafters already
considered and decided. 277
VI. CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF A SETTLED CHILD MAY BE ORDERED
PURSUANT ONLY TO DOMESTIC FAMILY LAW.

The Article 12 settled defense, including the one-year period
set out therein, reflects a careful balancing of the drafters’
interests in international comity and deterrence of child
abduction, and a child’s interest in settlement. The Convention’s

273. Id.
274. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2012).
275. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 (statement
by Justice Breyer), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-820_5368.pdf.
276. Id. at 46 (argument by Assistant Solicitor General Ann O’Connell).
277. The Yaman case likewise illustrates this point. On appeal, Ozgur
urged the court to consider [f]our main sets of interest implicated by the
Convention:
1) The interest in returning a child to her country of habitual
residence and maintaining jurisdiction for child custody
determinations there; 2) the interest in deterring child abductions; 3)
the interest in affording the left-behind parent a remedy for the
abduction[; and 4) the interests of the children and their ability to
thrive in a stable environment].
Brief for the Appellant at 67, Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, Document No.
00116536505. The drafters, however, already weighed these interests when
they established the one-year time period in Article 12.
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drafters concluded that, after a year, if a child is settled, a court
may not order the child’s return. They believed that a child’s wellbeing, if he is settled and a year has passed, must not be
compromised as punishment for the abducting parent’s conduct,
even if that means that the abducting parent benefits from
abducting and concealing the child by having the ability to litigate
the custody dispute in his or her home court. The First Circuit
conceded in the Yaman case that the district court’s concern that
ordering the return of a settled child “would be in effect [to]
rebalanc[e] competing public policy concerns that were already
balanced by the drafters of the Convention,” 278 would be valid if
the language of Article 12 were mandatory. 279 As argued in this
Article, however, Article’s 12’s prohibition on returning a settled
child is mandatory. Following a determination of settledness, a
child should not bear the brunt of a punishment aimed at
deterring his parent and other would-be abductors.
The text and drafting histories of the Convention and ICARA
make clear that neither one authorizes a court to exercise
equitable discretion to return a child deemed settled, and that
such a grant would contravene several of the Convention’s key
policy concerns, as well as the domestic relations exception and
the congressional record. When deciding Hague cases, federal
courts are not entitled to wield all of the equitable tools in their
“toolkit,”280 and if the return of a settled child is to occur, it must
take place, if at all, pursuant to domestic law. As Article 18
makes clear, domestic courts may exercise any power they
otherwise have to return an abducted child. 281 This article
278. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16 n.15.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 17.
281. This is, in fact, what Ozgur Yaman did. He successfully secured a
return order from a New Hampshire state court pursuant to the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. See Notice of Decision, In the
Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman, ECF No. 195-1. The New
Hampshire court issued that decision without examining the merits of the
custody decision. The authors of this article believe there may be preemption
issues related to the New Hampshire court’s decision to enforce the Turkish
custody order under New Hampshire state law in the face of the federal
district court’s refusal to return the children under federal law. Cf. In re
T.L.B., 272 P.3d 1148, 1155 (Co. App. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). Analysis of this
issue, however, is outside the scope of this article.
Additionally, whether the district court could have exercised

ROSSIANDSTARKFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2014 12:08 PM

150 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:106
envisions a narrowly circumscribed role for federal courts
adjudicating child abduction cases under the Hague Convention, a
view that comports with the drafters’ belief and Congress’
acknowledgment that children must be treated as people, not
property, and that no court should use the return of a child as a
means of punishing a wrongdoing parent. Thus, in the United
States—where Hague cases implicate principles of federalism,
family law, and international law—state courts retain sole custody
over the decision to return a settled child.

supplemental jurisdiction over Ozgur’s state law cause of action (brought
under the UCCJEA) is another important question that is outside the scope
of this Article. The domestic relations exception is an exception to both
diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. As explained in this
article, Congress granted federal courts concurrent original jurisdiction over
Hague cases in order to avoid provoking litigation that might arise if a
litigant sought to remove a case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
Nothing in the statute, however specifically addresses whether federal courts
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims. Compare
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)). It is clear, however,
that Congress intended to preclude federal courts from adjudicating any
custody-related question other than those that were specifically set out in the
Convention. In light of ICARA’s legislative history, Congress likely intended
to preclude federal courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
claims the adjudication of which would contravene the domestic relations
exception. It therefore would be inconsistent with ICARA for a litigant to use
supplemental jurisdiction as a means of circumventing the express language
in ICARA prohibiting courts from adjudicating custody disputes pursuant to
it.

